

8<sup>th</sup> Oct. 2012

الفault tolerant

Fault Tolerant System

لقد دامحالة

### o Fault Tolerance

is the attribute that enables a system to achieve Fault Tolerance operation

### o Fault Tolerant System

is one that can continue the correct performance of its specified task in the presence of H/w or S/w faults.

### o Fault Tolerant Computing $\Rightarrow$ "It's Process"

is used used to describe the process of performing calculation.

Failure

②

• Fault  $\triangleq$  Physical universe

in circuit  $\{H/W, S/W\}$  مكونات

• Error  $\triangleq$  Information universe

من الممكن نسيان

• Failure  $\triangleq$  external universe

من العالم الذي لا يهم الناس في العالم الذي يهم

User can notice it "seen"  $\rightarrow$

note

عيب امرأة رى تجعل ونعرف بغيرها

fa

\* Fault latency  $\triangleq$  (Fault  $\rightarrow$  error)

error  $\rightarrow$  fault  $\rightarrow$  صدمة من حدوث او صدمة من ارتكاب

\* Error latency  $\triangleq$  (error  $\rightarrow$  failure)

Failure  $\rightarrow$  Error  $\rightarrow$

Comment

\* Fault in Software

Specification mistakes

incorrect at algorithm  
or architecture

data or architecture  
algorithm

alg

algorithm  
architecture

## Faults

### Component defect

- Component wear out
- Random device defect
- Manufacturing imperfection

implementation mistakes

### Software Coding mistake

Poor Construction

Poor Component Selection

Poor design.

### Radiation

electromagnetic  
EM interference

battle damage

operator mistake

environmental  
extremes

(3)


external disturbance

disturbance

ALERT

wear out  
imperfection

## Fault attributes:



containment

Primary

③

## Fault Primary Techniques.

Fault avoidance

Fault masking

Fault tolerance.

Testing

Design Review screening

Component Screening

Quality Control methods

أخطاء ملحوظة لفترة ملحوظة

يتحقق أداءً ملحوظاً ب虧 ملحوظ

To detect and locate The Failure

C-Note  
"redundancy"

أداءً ملحوظاً ب虧 ملحوظ

Reconfiguration.

Fault detection

Fault location

Fault containment

Fault recovery

containment

recovery

10<sup>th</sup> Oct - 2012

⑥

Fault Tolerant System

## Fault Tolerant System

Approach

ما يزيد عن ١٠٪

### Objectives of Fault Tolerance :-

① Dependability  $QoS \rightarrow$  Quality of Service.

② Reliability  $R(t) R_u$  Condition Propriety

دقة العمل (دقة المعايير)  
intra, Reference

③ Availability  $A(t)$

متاحة

④ Safety  $S(t)$

وتحفظ

⑤ Performance  $P(t)$

أداء

أداء في المقام يحصل على معايير

معايير معايير

postponed

⑦

## ④ Main transability $M(t)$ $\rightarrow$ $\infty$

ادنى لـ 15 الف قتال قادر بـ 15000 قتاله في صورة (صورة محددة)  
(+ المفترض يتجاوز فيها الف قتال (العتبة المحددة))

Mr. Maitanabi

## ⑧ Testability

Set  $M_{11} = 0$ ;  $\text{Set } M_{12} = 0$ ;  $\text{Set } M_{21} = 0$ ;  $\text{Set } M_{22} = 0$  (Set  $M_{11} = 0$  and  $M_{21} = 0$  and  $M_{12} = 0$  and  $M_{22} = 0$ )

# Application of fault tolerant computing

✓ Long life App. → un manned space flight  
→ self drive 10 years

21 Critical Computation App.

- military systems.
- Industrial controllers

### 3) Maintenance Postponement App.

Post Penicillin ~~Beta~~ Rose, large +1 4-4 4

(c) High availability APP. (ATM) out of server

(5)

(8)

class (2) M Unit 11 Fault Tolerant System

17-10-2012

(3 marks based on Hints, 16% & 18%)

## Fault tolerant System.

### Redundancy :-

1. hardware Redundancy

2. Software Redundancy

3. line & Redundancy - not necessarily critical the line is redundant

### 4. Information Redundancy.

(Error detection & correction) redundant bits are added to the data

### Hardware REDUNDANCY :-

Physical replication

Physical replication  
replicates

1. Passive technique (masking)

It makes Fault-masking.

No action required error handling done by

fuse

Native Active

## 2- Action approach --

ACTION require

مُنْظَرٌ

وَكَاوِلَهُ تَبَلُّو رَعْنَى مُنْهَرَنَجَوْنَ

أَرْجَانِي

- Detecting faults
- Action to remove faulty H/W

العِرْدَةُ الْعَالِمَةُ & الْمُنْهَرَنَجَوْنَ

- Reconfiguration

## 3- HYbrid approach


Comparison between ① and ②

جُنْلِيْل

- Detect fault
- remove faulty H/W
- replacing H/W

→


Passive Techniques "approach"



TMR

Triple  
Module →  
Redundancy

Vote = one point of failure.



### ENotes-

#### design limitations-

- Size
- weight
- Power Consumption
- Cost

Voting may be Software to solve problems

limitation

Which is best S/w or H/w





Software

Hardware

10

11

tripaw, 2002: 10/10



Is the voter HW or S/W?

1 up

voter

- voter

2 Speed.

(11)

3/ Critical ; Space, weight.

(12)


4/ Power

5/ No. of voters different

5/ Future changes

## NMR

Number Module Redundancy.



14th Nov. 2012

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

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# REDUNDANCY

problems in TMR

1/ single point of failure

failure detection voter

2/ Component not accurately

(Component) مكون مكون ذات نفس القيمة لكن مكون مختلف من مكون (أ) (B)

3) ADC

in  $\rightarrow$  out

أي المدخلات I/P هي تيار مستمر A/C

Least Significant Bit LSB 1 Sensitivity 0/I/P 1 I/P


ignor LSB يعطى لها


To solve problem we make

MID-VALUE SELECT

that mean's if we have 3 values for voter

we will take the mid one "between two values"





low-current low-voltage

Closed-loop control passive H/w


### • Flux-Summing

مُكَوِّفَةُ دُوَّدِيَّةِ دَائِرَةِ الْفُلَقِ، يَعْنِي مَحَالَةُ الْمُكَوِّفَةِ دُوَّدِيَّةٍ، مُكَوِّفَةُ دُوَّدِيَّةِ دَائِرَةِ الْفُلَقِ، يَعْنِي مَحَالَةُ مُكَوِّفَةِ دُوَّدِيَّةٍ


stop goes up, so apply 3 to 2 to 1 to Mp1 this is 234

Passive Feedback for the motor


Flux summary



# ACTIVE H/W REDUNDANCY (15)



## DUPLICATION WITH COMPARISON



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The problem is -

- Errors from input

- - when the input is wrong


- Computer

inaccuracy

Apps & end o/p will

- Single point of failure

make computer as software to solve the above problems.



spark  
⑦  
S/W implementation of protection with computer  
Memory is good for shared-mem-12 active areas

## STAND-BY SPARING TECHNIQUES

Recovery when problem occurs.

### ① HOT SPARING

more power consumption / Critical protection blocks to choose  
delay is less than 100ms, cold or 1 delay if required  
and 100ms

### ② COLD SPARING

"latency" delay is more than "deadlock" delay

System stability

## HYBRID H/W

Faultmasking + active -

it's more advance


more hardware to have active + passive

① Large + Costly

③ use in Critical Apps.

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## Fault Detecting Unit



(19)

لهم اغفر لي

21th Nov. 2012

## Fault Tolerant System

• ~~SOFT INFORMATION~~ REDUNDANCY

Comp. (الجهاز) هو (البيانات) المدخل (البيانات) المدخل

## 1. Single bit Parity

2.1.1. Bit Per word

even Parity

0110 0  
 even summa  
 Fault

• odd Parity

even 0110 0  
 Fault 0 X 0 111  
 changing 0110 1

في متسلسل النفع / إذا لم يتحقق أي من المعايير

وإنصاف دو هسته سمعه وكمينة انتقام (كما في المرض) دو هسته ممكنه  
Comp. ممكنه دو هسته دوار

غير قادر على إثبات  
→ فار  
0000 0 even  
1111 1

How

0000 0 odd  
1111 1

20109 Bit Per byte (not 8 bit)

يقدر تكشف لا 1111 - 0000 / يقدر تكشف لا 1111 - 0000

even odd  
1011 1  
0011 0  
Fault ✗ ✗

فأول 11 هو الخطأ أو 511's ممكن تكشف الخطأ even أو odd

even odd  
0000 0  
0000 0  
Fault ✓ ✗ ①

even  
1111 1  
Fault ✗

all code is wrong

## 9.1.3 Bit Per Multiple Chip

(2N)

مدى 15  $\leftarrow 0$  صنع 2 بit في 1 chip

chip 1 3210

chip 2 7654

chip 3 11098

chip 4 15141312

chip 0

$P_3 P_2 P_1 P_0$

مدى 6 010011

101101212 11098 7654 3210

1101 1001 1110 1010

chip 1 1010

chip 2 1110

chip 3 1001

chip 4 1101

chip 0

0000  
 $P_3 P_2 P_1 P_0$


Memory Data 11011011

1011

1110

1001

1101



Fault


X

$\frac{1101}{0001}$

## 2.1.4 9 Bit Parity Chip Parity (22)

chip1	3210	$P_0$	chip0
chip2	7654	$P_1$	
chip3	11698	$P_2$	
chip4	1561312	$P_3$	

$P_0$  for chip 1



(23)

لهم ارحمنا

Nov. 2012

Fault Tolerant

Information Redundancy.

Hamming Code

word =  $n = 8$ redundancy =  $k$ 

$$2^k - 1 \geq n + k$$

$$2^k - 1 \geq 8$$

$$2^k - 1 - k \geq n$$

$$16 - 1 - 4 \geq 8$$

$$k = 4$$

 $P_0, P_1, P_2, P_3$ 
 $2^3, 2^2, 2^1, 2^0$ 
 $3, 2, 1, 0$ 
 $8, 4, 2, 1$ 

نقطة التحريك

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

P<sub>0</sub>, P<sub>1</sub>, P<sub>2</sub>, P<sub>3</sub>, w<sub>0</sub>, w<sub>1</sub>, w<sub>2</sub>, w<sub>3</sub>

words

w<sub>0</sub> w<sub>1</sub> w<sub>2</sub> w<sub>3</sub> P<sub>0</sub> P<sub>1</sub> P<sub>2</sub> P<sub>3</sub>w<sub>7</sub> w<sub>6</sub> w<sub>5</sub> w<sub>4</sub> P<sub>3</sub> w<sub>3</sub> w<sub>2</sub> w<sub>1</sub> P<sub>2</sub> w<sub>0</sub> P<sub>1</sub> P<sub>0</sub>

Priority word

n+k

2-1-1471 note

2u

$$n+k = 8+4 = 12$$

$$P_1 = \text{XOR } \{ \underbrace{3, 5, 7, 9, 11}_{\text{index and make or}} \}$$

1-6

$$P_2 = \text{XOR } \{ \underbrace{3, 6, 7, 10, 11}_{\text{0011}} \} \quad 011$$

$$P_3 = \text{XOR } \{ 5, 6, 7, 12 \}$$

$$P_{12} = \text{XOR } \{ 8, 10, 11, 12 \}$$

check

$$\sum_{i=1}^8 i = 36 = 5 \text{ sum fault}$$

$$q = \begin{pmatrix} 1001 \\ 1000 \\ 1000 \end{pmatrix}$$

check

$$c_1 = \text{XOR } \{ 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 \}$$

$$c_2 = \text{XOR } \{ 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11 \}$$

$$c_3 = \text{XOR } \{ 4, 5, 6, 7, 12 \}$$

$$c_4 = \text{XOR } \{ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 \}$$

Example

$$\begin{array}{r} 76 \\ 54 \\ 32 \\ 10 \\ \hline 000100 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 1100 \\ 1010 \\ 0101 \\ 1001 \\ \hline 010010 \end{array}$$

$$P_1 = 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 = 1 \quad 01001 = 0 -$$

$$P_2 = 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 = 0$$

$$P_3 = 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 = 1$$

$$P_4 = 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 = 0 \quad 0+1+0+1 = 0$$

$$0+0+1 = 0 \quad 0+1+0 = 1$$

25

Part Code -

110000101001  
12016987654321

if we estimate that we got it as =

$$g = \oplus_0 \oplus_0 \oplus_0 \oplus_0 \oplus_1 = 1100001 = 0$$

$$S = 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 = 0 \quad \text{but } 1001 = 9$$

$$= 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 = 0 \quad \begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \end{smallmatrix}$$

$$c_1 = 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 = 0 \quad 00011 = 0$$

it must be ~~environmental changes~~  
Fault  
code → no error correct code

if there is ever

if we got it as

$$S_1 = 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 = 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 = \text{error}$$

$$S = 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 + (1, 0) \quad \wedge \wedge$$

$$c = 1 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \dots \rightarrow 1$$

$$c_4 = 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 \oplus 0 = 0$$

C<sub>4</sub>C<sub>3</sub>C<sub>2</sub>E

0101 error int

11/21

八

حفل تسلیح و نیز لقا

Sinhar

- check sum - CR

- Time redundancy / software Redundancy

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Dec 2012 100/100 00/00

## Fault tolerance system

### Reliability evaluation

#### Techniques

- Definition
- Failure rate  $\lambda$   $\lambda$ ?
- Reliability
- $N, N_0(t), N_f(t)$

$$R(t) = \frac{N_0(t)}{N} \rightarrow$$
$$= \frac{N_0(t)}{N_0(t) + N_f(t)} \rightarrow \text{Survivor Function} \quad \textcircled{1}$$

Unreliability

$$Q(t) = \frac{N_f(t)}{N} \rightarrow \frac{N_f(t)}{N_0(t) + N_f(t)} \quad \textcircled{2}$$

$$R(t) = 1 - Q(t)$$

$$= \frac{N - N_f(t)}{N}$$

$$\frac{dR(t)}{dt} = -\frac{1}{N} \rightarrow \frac{dN_f(t)}{dt} \quad \textcircled{3}$$

$$\frac{dN_f(t)}{dt} = -(N) \cdot \frac{dR(t)}{dt}$$

(27)

Failure rate Function

$$\frac{dN_f(t)}{dt} \propto N_f(t)$$

$$Z(t) = \frac{1}{N_f(t)} \cdot \frac{dN_f(t)}{dt}$$

Hazard Function

Hazard rate, failure rate function

$$Z(t) = \frac{1}{N_f(t)} \cdot \frac{dN_f(t)}{dt}$$

$$Z(t) = -\frac{dR(t)}{dt}$$

↑ unreliability

R(t)

$$Z(t) = + \frac{d}{dt} \left( \frac{Q(-t)}{1 - Q(t)} \right)$$

Failure density function

FDF


$$\frac{dQ(t)}{dt} = FDF(\lambda)$$

Failure density function

Failure rate function

in electronics equipment -

68



## Infant morbidity

## Semi Constant

لقد صدر في القسمين بغير سابق

$$\frac{dR(t)}{dt} = -2 \underbrace{(t)}_{\text{const}} R(t)$$

$$R(t) = \int z(t) \cdot dt$$

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$

reliability of ulp

$$\lambda = \text{const}$$

Mean time to failure: ~~and mostly~~

98

الرخصة تحدى حسب أول Factor

MTTF

$$MTTF = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N t_i}{N} \rightarrow \frac{0.09}{6} = 0.015$$

Predicted time

$$E[X] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x f(x) - dx$$

to predict first time

when failure is happened.

$$MTTF = \int_0^{\infty} e f(t) dt$$

مقدار میان زمان

$f(t)$  = Failure design fun

$$MTTF = \int_0^{\infty} t \cdot dQ(t)$$

$$MTTF = \int_{0}^{\infty} t dR(t) = \frac{1}{\lambda}$$

$$= \left[ -t R(t) + \int_0^\infty -R(t) \cdot dt \right]_{t=0}^{\infty}$$

$$MTTF = \int_0^{\infty} R(t) \cdot dt$$

## Mean time to Repair MTTR. (80)

متوسط وقت الاصلاح يعني حاصل على قيمه  
متوسط اوقات من الاصلاح لبعض اجهزة الملاحة لاصلاح اعطالها

$$MTTR = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N t_i}{N} = \frac{1}{\mu}$$

$\mu$  = Repair rate (No. of repair / hours)

## Mean time between Failure MTBF

متوسط اوقات بين اعطال اجهزة الملاحة

$$n(\text{arg}) = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{n_i}{N}$$

$$MTBF = \frac{1}{n(\text{arg})}$$

$$f_1 \rightarrow f_2$$

$$MTBF = MTTF + MTTR$$

26<sup>th</sup> Dec-2012

(3)

## Fault tolerant system.

## Design Methodology

### Design process-

- ① - Problem definition
- ② - System requirement
- ③ - System Partitioning *partitioning*
- ④ - Concept Development  $\rightarrow$  mechanism
- ⑤ - High Level analysis *selected test case*  
simulator, tools
- ⑥ - Hardware and software specification
- ⑦ - Hardware and software Design and analysis *implementation*
- ⑧ - Testing *few steps*

Performance as general

System integration test

↓ →  
System  
Component  
of. 1st  
take off

## Fault Avoidance in the Design Process

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خواص (العزم)

### ① Requirement Design review

more than normal

or go out

### ② - Conceptual Design + Review

1) mean 2) time will use concept - basic 3) cost

zim

### ③ - Specification Design Review

plan 1) alternative 2) use 3) go out 4) new 5)

### ④ - Detailed Design Review

not review (عزم) do not

### ⑤ - Final Review

### ⑥ - Part Selection

1) cost / 2) quality

2) availability

### ⑦ - Design Rules

3) use 4) go out

5) not use 6) go out

### ⑧ - Documentation

## Reliability models

Probability

use

models

models


(33)

\* Combinational models

\* Series models

\* Parallel models

Series models -



$C_{\text{sw}}(t)$

$C_{\text{sw}}(t)$

working wear  $\rightarrow$  ~~proper~~  $\rightarrow$

proper attire  $\rightarrow$  ~~proper~~  $\rightarrow$

propagating

$$R(t) = \underset{\text{series}}{P} \left[ C_{1w}(t) \cap C_{2w}(t) \cap \dots \cap C_{Nw}(t) \right]$$

$$R(t) = \underset{\text{series}}{R_1(t) \cdot R_2(t) \cdot \dots \cdot R_N(t)}$$


$$R_{\text{series}}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^N R_i(t)$$

$\lambda = \text{const}$

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda_1 t} \cdot e^{-\lambda_2 t} \cdot \dots \cdot e^{-\lambda_N t}$$

$$R_{\text{series}}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^N \lambda_i t$$

## Parallel models :-



Component  
 No. of failure  
 Failure rate  
 unreliability

$$Q_{\text{parallel}}(t) = P \left[ \bigcap_{i=1}^N Q_i(t) \right] = Q_1(t) \cdot Q_2(t) \cdots Q_N(t)$$

$$Q_{\text{parallel}}(t) = Q_1(t) \cdot Q_2(t) \cdots Q_N(t)$$

$$Q_{\text{parallel}}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^N Q_i(t)$$

$$Q_{\text{parallel}}(t) = 1 - Q_{\text{parallel}}^{(t)}$$

$$= 1 - \prod_{i=1}^N Q_{i\text{un}}(t)$$

$$= 1 - \prod_{i=1}^N (1 - R_i(t))$$

(38)


$$R_{\text{Para}}(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^N (1 - R_i(t))$$

69c TMR motn  $\frac{1}{2673}$  extended

$$R(t) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-m} i \cdot R_i(t) (1 - R(t))$$

$$C^N = \frac{N!}{(N-i)! \cdot i!}$$

## Markov Model

 $R(t)$  $R(t + \Delta t)$

16<sup>th</sup> Jan. - 2013

(3)

all will be end


Last lect.

Fault tolerant

Reliability model Markov

Maintainability modeling

Markov



$$P_3(t + \Delta t) = (1 - 3\Delta t) P_3(t)$$

$$P_2(t + \Delta t) = 3\Delta t P_3(t) + (1 - 2\Delta t) P_2(t)$$

$$P_F(t + \Delta t) = 2\Delta t P_2(t) + P_F(t)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_3(t + \Delta t) \\ P_2(t + \Delta t) \\ P_F(t + \Delta t) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - 3\Delta t & 0 & 0 \\ 3\Delta t & 1 - 2\Delta t & 0 \\ 0 & 2\Delta t & 1 \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} P_3(t) \\ P_2(t) \\ P_F(t) \end{bmatrix}$$

See Salma her Paper

EDITED  
BY

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Captured By iPhone 5

